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Resumo
Este artigo testa implicações do modelo de discriminação por prefe-
rência de Becker (1957). Utilizando dados brasileiros, rejeita-se a hipótese
de que o hiato salarial entre brancos e negros seja determinado pelo nível
médio de discriminação. Os resultados mostram que o hiato está relaci-
onado ao grau de discriminação do empregador marginal, isto é, aquele
que mais discrimina entre os que contratam negros. Além disso, os resul-
tados estão de acordo com a previsão de que o hiato salarial é maior em
lugares com maior proporção de negros no mercado de trabalho, ou seja,
onde há mais interação social entre raças.
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Abstract
This paper tests Becker’s model of preference discrimination. Using
Brazilian data, we reject the hypothesis that the black-white conditional
wage gap is determined by the average degree of employers’ prejudice.
Instead, we show that the racial wage gap is related to the degree of preju-
dice of the marginal employer, i.e., the employer who most discriminates
among those who hire blacks. We also found that the wage gap is posi-
tively correlated with the proportion of blacks in the labor market, which
means that blacks are more discriminated where there is more social in-
teraction among races.
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1 Introduction
A national representative survey conducted by the Brazilian National Statis-
tics Oﬃce (IBGE) in 2008 shows that 71% of respondents believe that race
influences labor relationships, while only 40% think the same for marriage 1.
Although specific to the Brazilian context, this finding reveals that personal
attributes unrelated to productivity may be a determinant of the persistence
of the racial wage gap at the beginning of the twenty-first century. This paper
tests this hypothesis by testing two implications of Becker’s (1957) employer’s
discrimination model using Brazilian data. According to the model, given
the distribution of preferences for discrimination, the higher the proportion
of the minority to the majority, the larger the wage gap will be. The second
prediction states that the average degree of prejudice among employers is not
a key determinant of the racial wage gap; what matters is the degree of prej-
udice of the “marginal employer”, i.e, the employer who most discriminates
against blacks among those who hire blacks.
The racial wage gap conditional on observable characteristics has been at-
tributed to discrimination for decades. The main reason is that the term re-
lated to the fixed eﬀect of race in Mincerian equations remains relevant in
regression estimates even with the availability of more accurate information
and the improvement of econometric methods to deal with sample selection
and other related issues. Because of that, there is still a debate in the literature
about the extent to which that fixed eﬀect term reflects discrimination in the
labor market.
In recent years, the literature focused on the study of the characteristics
typically excluded from wage equations that may lead to diﬀerences in the
labor market (Fryer 2011, Bertrand 2011). This approach aims to reveal the
portion of the wage gap that is due to unobservable productive characteristics
and, therefore, cannot be attributed to discrimination. Quality of education,
eﬀective market experience, risk aversion and investments in early childhood
cognitive and non-cognitive skills are some of the main factors considered
responsible for diﬀerences in pay and other outcomes as the unemployment
rate, for example between blacks and whites (Neal & Johnson 1996, Card &
Krueger 1992, Carneiro et al. 2003).
On the other hand, direct evidence of market generating these diﬀerences
instead of just reproducing them is relatively scarce. Consistent with statis-
tical discrimination model (Phelps 1972), List (2004) finds evidence of dis-
crimination against minorities (blacks and women) in an experiment in the
sports cards market, in which the minority receives lower oﬀers when try-
ing to sell their cards, and larger when they want to buy. Bertrand & Mul-
lainathan (2004) document that, after sending virtually identical fake CVs to
media companies, those whose names were more associated with white peo-
ple received more call backs for interviews than CVs with names associated
with blacks.
It could be argued that evidences of statistical discrimination just corrob-
orate the view that the market only reproduces inequalities because they are
based on employers’ beliefs, not preferences. Evidences of discrimination by
preference are presented by Goldin & Rouse (2000) and Anwar et al. (2012).
1Pesquisa Características Étnico-Raciais da População (Racial-Ethnic Characteristics of the
Population Survey), 2008.
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Goldin and Rouse show that the women’s probability of success at each stage
of selection of musicians for the five major orchestras in the USA increased
substantially after the introduction of a process in which referees had no vi-
sual contact with candidates. Anwar et al. (2012), analyzing criminal trials
in the USA, report that juries composed of whites only condemn blacks more
often than whites, and that this diﬀerence is eliminated when there is at least
one black person among jury members. However, although such studies re-
port results in line with a model of discrimination by preference, they have
no direct relationship to the labor market in general, and to the wage gap in
particular.
Becker’s employer discrimination model explains the mechanism through
which the employer’s prejudice against minorities may cause wage diﬀeren-
tials between majority and minority groups in the labor market. Despite the
impact on the economic theory this model caused at the time it was published,
empirical studies walked toward the analysis of non-observable characteris-
tics, as evidenced above. Only a few years ago there was the first attempt
to empirically test the specific predictions of Becker’s model, by Charles &
Guryan (2008). The authors found evidence that racial discrimination by pref-
erence is responsible for about a quarter of the observed wage gap between
white and black men in USA. Hjort (2014) analyzes a production of packag-
ing flowers in Kenya, where there are several teams with three workers each,
in which a supplier (upstream worker) distributes material for two processors
(downstreamworkers). The author shows that when the supplier’s ethnicity is
diﬀerent from at least one of the processors’, the former distributes less flow-
ers to the processor of distinct ethnicity, leading to a reduction in the team’s
output, which causes a reduction in payment for all teammembers, including
the supplier.
In order to test the aforementioned predictions of the model, we imple-
ment a methodology similar to Charles & Guryan (2008). From the 2010 Cen-
sus microdata, we first estimate the racial wage gap for each Brazilianmicrore-
gion through a Mincerian equation at the individual level. A microregion, our
definition of local market, is defined by IBGE as a set of geographically nearby
integrated municipalities. In a second stage, at the microregional level, the es-
timated wage diﬀerentials are regressed on the proportion of blacks and preju-
dice measures. Because Brazil is a developing country with a highly regulated
market, the eﬀects are potentially diﬀerent from those discussed by Charles &
Guryan (2008) for USA.More importantly, Brazil is a highly mixed society and
oﬀers a distinct perspective to study and better understand the consequences
of racial discrimination and the meaning of the expression “Racial Democ-
racy”, that was used to describe Brazilian society during several decades in
the twentieth century (Jaccoud 2008).
The measures of preference for discrimination are obtained from a preju-
dice distribution for eachmicroregion. The Ações Discriminatórias no Âmbito
Escolar survey (Discriminatory Actions in the School Survey, 2008) provides
the information necessary for the construction of an individual prejudice in-
dex which, in turn, is used to recover the distribution of preference for dis-
crimination. This survey investigates the incidence of prejudice and discrimi-
natory behavior against blacks (and women and poor among others) in Brazil-
ian public schools. With that distribution at hand, we are able to get any of
its moments. It is assumed that the distribution recovered from this survey is
representative of the propensity of employers to discriminate against blacks
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in each microregion. In general, the results confirm the theoretical predic-
tions tested. In particular, using our preferred specification - an increase of
10 percentage points in the proportion of blacks in the labor market - results
in a 14% increase in the black-white conditional wage gap. Therefore, there
is more discrimination against blacks in localities where there is higher inter-
action between blacks and whites, a result that challenges the label “Racial
Democracy” attached to Brazilian society, at least regarding economic rela-
tionships. Our findings also show that, as predicted by the model, the average
discrimination does not have a role in the determination of the racial wage
gap. On the other hand, an increase of one standard deviation in the marginal
employer discrimination index increases the conditional wage gap by 27%.
We also show that unobserved productivity characteristics are not driving
our results. Assuming that access to public goods reduces the diﬀerences be-
tween blacks and whites in terms of quality of health and education, when
we control for access to public goods, the impact of the marginal employer
prejudice on the racial wage gap remains practically constant.
This paper is divided into five sections besides this introduction and the
final remarks. The next section discusses some racial aspects in Brazil, high-
lighting the social context in which this paper is inserted. In Section 3, we
briefly discuss the model of discrimination by preference. Section 4 provides
information on data sources, performs a descriptive analysis, and discusses
themethods used to recover the distribution of racial prejudice. The empirical
strategy is the subject of Section 5, followed by the discussion of the results.
2 Racial aspects in Brazil
Brazil is a highly race-mixed society. Centuries ago, whites (Europeans), blacks
(slaves) and natives gave rise to an “intermediate” race called pardos (in En-
glish, both mixed and brown could be used to identify them). A black-native
descendant might be considered pardo, as well as a white-native descendant
or a black-white one.
Nevertheless, despite being a racial category oﬃcially used by the govern-
ment and other agencies for registry and survey purposes, pardo is a word that
sounds a little bit unnatural and suﬀers some rejection by the population. It
is not uncommon for people to use the word moreno (brunette) instead. The
problem is that virtually everyone can be attached to or self-report as moreno.
For example, a German descendant person could be considered moreno be-
cause their hair is black, but they would hardly be called pardo. On the other
hand, a person who would be considered black in the USA because of their
skin tone could also self-report as moreno.
The 1976 National Household Survey (PNAD), surveyed by IBGE, included
a spontaneous-response question about the interviewee’s color or race in ad-
dition to the induced one. The induced categories are white, black, yellow
(Asian), brown and native. About 57% of spontaneous responses are four of
the induced categories (white, black, yellow, brown). On the other hand, 38%
are concentrated in other three categories: moreno (brunette), moreno claro
(light brunette) and clara (this last one could be translated as lighter brunette).
When comparing induced responses to spontaneous ones, 66% of browns re-
ported they were brunette. Not surprisingly, though, 14% of whites and 33%
of blacks did the same. Therefore, most of brunettes do not want to be viewed
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as brown, a non negligible share of blacks prefer to be considered brown, and
some whites do not want to be white 2.
Although the same induced categorization wasmaintained for several waves
in IBGE surveys, Schwartzman (1999) notes that older cohorts are more likely
to self-report as white than younger cohorts. The decrease in the percentage
of whites comes with a proportional increase in the percentage of browns and
no change in the percentage of blacks. This indicates that the rejection of the
white category by young people has more to do with identity than with mis-
cegenation of the population, since in the latter case a decrease in the propor-
tion of blacks would also be observed. Something similar occurred in the USA.
Nix & Qian (2015) report that 20% of black men “passed” as whites during
the 1880-1960 period, probably motivated by better social, political and eco-
nomic opportunities. Antman & Duncan (2015) present evidence from more
recent years (1997-2011). They found that individuals who benefited from
aﬃrmative action policies in the USA are 30% less likely to identify with their
minority groups after the policy is banned.
In this context of this paper, what matters is how the employer sees the
workers. Would a white employer who self-reports as brunette consider a
brown or black worker who does the same as her equal? This question has
no easy answer, but is crucial in all racial studies related to discrimination by
preference. In Brazil, for example, it is very important because the definition
of minority becomes a little bit awkward when browns are considered part
of the minority along with blacks. In 2013, according to PNAD, blacks rep-
resented 8% of the population, while browns represented 45%; Asians and
natives did not reach 1%. Thus, the minority group would actually account
for more than half of the population because brown people are a very large
group3. Because browns and whites are very diﬀerent groups in terms of so-
cioeconomic indicators (see Table A.1 in the appendix based on Census 2010),
it is probably not accurate to consider browns as part of the majority group4.
Thus, in Brazil, “minority” is a term less related to size and more related to
socioeconomic characteristics. Accordingly, in the following sections of this
paper, unless when explicitly indicated, the words “black” and “minority” re-
fer to individuals who declare themselves as black, brown, native, brunette
and other related terms5.
The expression Racial Democracy to describe the Brazilian society was cre-
ated in a period where the existence of prejudice against blacks was rejected
by some researchers (Osorio 2008). The upward mobility of browns was con-
sidered proof that there was no prejudice. According to this view, browns who
ascended in society were distant from slavery (abolished in 1888) in terms
of ancestors, and, due to the country’s economic development, it was only a
2Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, the PNAD 1976 is the only survey that imple-
mented this type of question. Of course, the scenario described might be diﬀerent today.
3Kreisman & Rangel (2015), using NLSY97 data that allow the survey interviewers to clas-
sify interviewees in a scaled measured skin tone, show that white interviewers tend to classify a
black interviewee as darker black than black interviewers. Therefore, the proportion of blacks
according to blacks in that country is probably diﬀerent from the oﬃcial statistic.
4Still, there may be some controversy. Osorio (2003) discusses the IBGE system for races
and calls attention to the “social variation of color” issue, where social ascension can create a
“whitening” eﬀect.
5IBGE surveys used in this paper always adopt the five induced self-reported categories men-
tioned above. In the Discriminatory Actions in the School survey it is possible to choose brunette
and mulatto in addition to those five.
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matter of time for the same to occur with “darker blacks”, who had closer
ancestors in slavery. In this sense, there would only be some sort of “class
prejudice without racial prejudice”. At the time the expression was created
in the 1940s and 1950s, social classes and racial groups defined pretty much
the same population groups, and there was almost no competition between
whites and blacks for positions in the labor market.
More recently, this view was challenged. The success of Italian immigrants
in comparison to the stagnation of blacks in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury is considered an example of how discrimination prevented the rising of
blacks. In spite of being poor or not, Italians were able to integrate into so-
ciety, either through acceptance in restricted-to-white clubs, or through mar-
riage with Brazilians. Later, in addition, despite the economic growth in the
1970s, the persistence of racial inequality suggested that discrimination was
stronger than previously thought and that only the political action of blacks
could lead to equalization (Osorio 2008).
This sociological view is related to the idea that the market only repro-
duces inequality. However, in the economic literature, it was precisely the
focus on this concept that led the idea of prejudice preventing the rising of
blacks to lose empirical support. Among other features not necessarily related
to labor market, such as risk aversion, it would be a matter of investment in
cognitive and non-cognitive abilities to reach a less unequal society. Neverthe-
less, the persistence of the racial wage gap in several countries in the twenty-
first century suggests that there is some component in the determination of
the wage gap that is unrelated to skill formation. The next section presents
the mechanism through which an employer’s preference for discrimination
can lead to a wage diﬀerential by race.
3 Employer’s discrimination model
The theoretical framework to support empirical analysis is the model of em-
ployer’s preference discrimination developed by Becker (1957). The model
assumes the existence of two groups in a given population or local market.
One group is the majority (A), and the other is the minority (V ). The size of
each group is fixed and they both supply labor inelastically. Only Amembers
can be employers and there is no entry in the product market. Let’s assume
that A’s and V ’s are perfect substitutes in a production function that depends
only on labor. Every employer has a discrimination coeﬃcient, d ≥ 0, indi-
cating the monetary value of the disutility of interacting with minority mem-
bers: higher values mean higher prejudice. Let’s assume that d is distributed
according to H(d).
The employer’s problem is to choose the number of employees of each
group LA and LV that maximizes his utility UE . This utility is given by a
combination of profit and disutility of interacting with the minority:
UE = F(LA + LV )−wALA −wV LV −wV dLV (1)
where wk is the wage of k = A,V .
The first order conditions indicate that the number of workers of each
group the employer hires in equilibrium, L∗A and L
∗
V , should be such that
FL∗A ≤ wA, with equality if L
∗
A > 0 (2)
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FL∗V ≤ wV (1 + d), with equality if L
∗
V > 0. (3)
That is, if the disutility of the employer is such that wA < wV (1 + d), the
employer hires only A’s. If, on the other hand, we have wA > wV (1 + d), only
V ’s are hired. In this sense, market forces induce minority members to be
hired by employers who do not discriminate or discriminate less, while the
A’s are hired by employers with greater discrimination coeﬃcients. For some
employer, the “marginal” employer, the following condition must hold:
w∗A = w
∗
V (1 + d
∗). (4)
The marginal employer, therefore, is the one with the highest coeﬃcient of
discrimination that hires workers belonging to the minority group, i.e., he is
the employer who is indiﬀerent between hiring workers fromminority or ma-
jority groups. Consequently, d∗, the discrimination coeﬃcient of the marginal
employer, corresponds to the wage gap between A’s and V ’s in equilibrium. If
d∗ = 0, there is no wage gap in the labor market even if there exist employers
with d > 0 in the product market. This implies, counter- intuitively, that the
employers’ average discrimination is not relevant to the determination of the
wage gap. That is, even though 90% of employers would discriminate against
V ’s, if the V ’s were all hired by employers who do not discriminate (d∗ = 0),
there is no wage diﬀerential between A’s and V ’s in this economy. This is the
main prediction of the Becker’s model.
The sortingmechanism mentioned above is the mechanism through which
whowill be themarginal employer is defined. Thus, the identity of themarginal
employer depends on the relative size of the V population and on the distri-
bution of the discrimination coeﬃcient among employers. Given the distribu-
tion of prejudice, the higher the proportion of minority to the majority, the
higher the probability is that the minority will be absorbed by an employer
with a higher coeﬃcient of discrimination. To illustrate this, under decreas-
ing returns to scale, suppose there are ten employers who hire one worker
each, and there is only one black worker in the labor market. According to the
model, this black worker will be hired by the least discriminating employer.
Now, suppose that there are two black workers. All else being equal, the
marginal employer is now the second who least discriminates against blacks.
Therefore, if the coeﬃcient of discrimination of this second employer is higher
than the first one, the increase in the proportion of black workers leads to an
increase in the wage gap.
The distribution of prejudice may also be relevant in determining the wage
gap through themarginal employer. If there is an increase in prejudice against
blacks, the coeﬃcient of discrimination of the marginal employer will in-
crease, causing the racial wage gap to be higher. Notice that the identity of
the marginal employer does not change. On the other hand, if the proportion
of blacks changes, the identity of the marginal employer will also change.
In summary, the model generates two main predictions to be tested em-
pirically in this paper. The first one is that the higher the proportion of the
minority in the labor market, the larger the wage gap between the majority
and the minority tends to be. The second one is that the relevant factor in
determining the wage diﬀerential is the degree of prejudice of the marginal
employer, not the mean degree of prejudice among employers.
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4 Data and Descriptive Analysis
4.1 Data sources
This paper has two main data sources. The first one is the Ações Discrim-
inatórias no Âmbito Escolar survey (Discriminatory Actions in the School,
hereinafter called ADAE), conducted jointly by the National Institute of Ed-
ucational Studies (INEP), a government agency under the Ministry of Educa-
tion and Culture (MEC), and the Institute of Economic Research Foundation
of the University of São Paulo (FIPE-USP). The main objective of the ADAE
survey is to investigate the incidence of prejudice and discriminatory behavior
by race, gender and socioeconomic condition, among others in Brazilian pub-
lic schools. The survey had a predetermined target: students in the 7th or 8th
grade of elementary school, or in the 3rd or 4th grade of high school. To con-
duct the survey, 501 schools from all over the country were randomly selected,
with selection probability proportional to the number of student enrollments
following three strata: geographical regions (North, Northeast, South, South-
east and Center-West), location area ( urban or rural), and course modality
(regular or adult education). In each selected school, a class was randomly
selected among the targeted ones. All students from the selected class were
interviewed, as well as their Portuguese and Math teachers. Additionally, two
parents and two staﬀmembers were interviewed. Unfortunately, it is not clear
how these individuals were selected. All we know is that the parents should
have their son or daughter enrolled in the selected class. Thus, they are not
necessarily the mother and the father of a given student. Finally, the school’s
Principal was also interviewed. The sample contains 18,599 observations dis-
tributed in 353 municipalities.
The ADAE questionnaire has, among others questions, 18 statements (listed
in the appendix) related to preference for racial discrimination. They either
compare whites and blacks directly, or describe some aspect about blacks. In-
dividuals are asked to choose one of four levels of agreement regarding the
proposed statements: strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree
or strongly agree. For example, the respondent is asked to choose the alter-
native that best indicates his level of agreement regarding the statement “In
general, whites study harder than blacks”.
As will become clear below, we use ADAE sample to construct the distri-
bution of prejudice for each locality. Due to the reduced number of obser-
vations in a large number of municipalities from the sample (68% with less
than 40 observations), a local market is defined here as a set of geographically
nearby integrated municipalities, denominated microregion by IBGE. In total,
the 353 municipalities are distributed into 230 microregions. This will be the
main unit of analysis of the paper.
The second main data source is the microdata from the 2010 Demographic
Census, conducted by IBGE. This survey allows us to estimate wage diﬀeren-
tials between whites and blacks for each local labor market. The Census sam-
ple consists of men between 25 and 60 years of age who live in one of the 230
microregions from the ADAE sample, whose occupation is not self-employed
or employer, who work at least 30 hours per week and receive positive wage.
We use other data sources to construct control variables in order to isolate
local microregional eﬀects potentially associated with the variables of inter-
est, the prejudice measures described below. Thus, we use information from
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2008 School Census (to assess the number of public schools) and 2007 Ideb (a
Quality of School Index, elaborated by INEP). Also, we use local development
indicators: the 2000 Municipal Human Development Index IDH-M jointly
elaborated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Brazil,
the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), and João Pinheiro Foun-
dation; and a health development index, elaborated by FIRJAN6 using public
data. Finally, the 2010 Census is used in the construction of the Gini index
(measuring household income inequality). All databases used in this paper
are public and available for download.
4.2 Samples characteristics
In this paper, it is assumed that the ADAE sample is an employers’ represen-
tative sample. Table 1 shows the ADAE sample characteristics. Most of the
respondents live in urban areas, women are overrepresented, and, because
81% of the respondents are students, the mean age is around 24. The av-
erage years of schooling (7.3) is higher than the average schooling for the
entire population in Brazil (5, according to PNAD 2008). In this table, we
separate blacks from browns. Thus, 4.3% of the respondents self-reported
themselves as blacks, while almost 60% declared to be brown (pardo), moreno,
mulatto or native7. Considering brown as part of the minority, the propor-
tion of blacks in the sample, 63%, is higher than the mean in the Brazilian
population (around 53%).
Table 1: Characteristics of ADAE sample
mean s.d.
Urban 0.957 0.203
Woman 0.597 0.490
Age 23.7 12.4
Years of scholing 7.3 2.6
White 0.369 0.483
Black 0.043 0.202
Brown 0.588 0.492
Type of interviewee
Students* 0.811 0.391
Students at school age** 0.552 0.497
Observations 18599
Source: Discriminatory Actions in the School
(ADAE) survey, 2008. White includes Asians.
Brown includes all races but whites and blacks. *
Students include regular-elementary, regular-high
school, adult-elementary and adult-high school.
Non-students include parents, School Principal,
teachers and staﬀ members. ** Students enrolled
in regular-elementary and regular-high school
courses.
6Federation of Industries of State of Rio de Janeiro.
7Native includes indigenous people as well as white-native (caboclo) and black-native (ca-
fuso) descendants. They represent 2% of the sample.
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In Brazil, employers are mainly men (73%) and have the highest average
levels of education among all positions in occupation (9.7 years of schooling,
PNAD 2008). Therefore, there is a concern related to the representativeness
of the ADAE sample. As mentioned before, the sample comes from public
schools, which means there could be little correspondence between the sam-
ple and the employer population in several socioeconomic aspects. Neverthe-
less, it is not necessary that the sample be strictly representative of employers.
At first, all we need is that individuals in the ADAE sample exhibit similar dis-
criminatory behavior one would expect employers to have. If prejudice and
discriminatory behavior are disseminated in the society, this will probably be
the case. Unfortunately, there is no way to test this assumption. However, one
can assert that if the marginal discriminator’s index of prejudice (see below)
provided by ADAE sample is higher than the true parameter in all microre-
gions (which basically means that the sample would produce a more preju-
diced marginal employer than the population), then we will probably have
a higher correlation between the index of prejudice and the racial wage gap
than one would expect with a representative sample. We are going to argue
that this is not the case, and that it would be very diﬃcult to rationalize our
results if the representativeness assumption is violated.
4.3 Index of Discrimination
As discussed in Section 3, in order to test Becker’s model, it is necessary to
recover some moments of the distribution of employer’s prejudice. The first
step in this direction is obtaining an individual index of prejudice. From this
index, we can construct the distribution of prejudice for each microregion,
and hence, assess any of its moments.
The individual Index of Discrimination, IDi , based on Charles & Guryan
(2008), is generated from the respondents evaluation about the ADAE state-
ments mentioned above. To transform qualitative variables into quantitative
ones, we adopt the simplest possible way: for each question, values 1 to 4 are
assigned to each response, with 1 being “strongly disagree" and 4, “strongly
agree". Performing this way, higher values are associated with more discrimi-
nation. The IDi is equal to the average of the normalized variables, i.e.
IDi =
1
Qi
Qi∑
q=1
Xiq −Xq
sd(Xq)
(5)
whereQi is the number of statements evaluated by the respondent i, Xiq is
the observed response of individual i to the statement q, andXq and sd(Xq) are
the average of Xiq and its standard deviation for the statement q across i. The
index values do not have a meaningful quantitative interpretation; only indi-
cate that the higher the value, the more prejudiced is the individual. Ranking
this index across individuals within each micro-region recovers the distribu-
tion of prejudice for each micro-region.
Figure 1 shows the regional diﬀerences of racial prejudice and the com-
position of the population. It is one can see the cumulative distribution of
the discrimination index. It is observed that the North appears more prone
to discrimination against blacks, followed by the Northeast. The Southeast,
in its turn, is the geographical region less prone to discrimination. On the
right side of the figure, the proportion of blacks by macro-region is presented.
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Generally speaking, prejudice and proportion of blacks seem to be positively
correlated.
Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of the Index of Discrimination
and Distribution of the proportion of blacks by macro-region
Table 2 investigates the relationship between personal attributes and prej-
udice at the individual level using the ADAE sample. In addition to the
controls shown in the table, all regressions include dummies for states and
groups of interviewees8. Column (1) presents a regression of the index of dis-
crimination on individual characteristics. Women and more educated people
discriminate less. Although our sample is composed of less educated people
than employers are, they are more educated than average, and will be even
more educated when the students, who represent 81% of the sample, finish
school. In addition, it is possible that we have a less prejudiced sample be-
cause women are overrepresented (remember that a large share of employers
is male). Thus, if the representativeness assumption were violated, our mea-
sures of prejudice would probably capture less prejudice than we truly have
among employers.
In Table 2, we separate blacks from browns again. Whites discriminate
more against blacks than blacks and browns. On the other hand, column (1)
shows that even among non-whites there is some room for discriminatory be-
havior, since browns discriminate more than blacks. This distinct behavior
among non-whites is documented by Kreisman & Rangel (2015) in a diﬀerent
context for the US, where darker black NLSY1997 survey interviewers tend
to classify blacks as lighter blacks than whites. Because the share of whites
in the ADAE sample is less than this share among employers, and because
whites discriminate more against blacks, again, we might be pushing the de-
gree of prejudice of the potential marginal discriminator toward zero with
this sample.
The same association between the index of prejudice and individual char-
acteristic can be seen in the remaining columns of Table 2. Each of them
8Parents, principals, teachers, staﬀ members and courses.
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shows the regression coeﬃcients for the dependent variable resulting from a
specific statement. In column (5), for example, the statement is “Blacks have
gotten more than they deserve". According to the results, women agree less
with this statement than men. The same goes for “Whites are more evolved"
in column (3).
Comparing to the results reported by Charles & Guryan (2008) for the US,
more educated people also discriminate less in that country. On the other
hand, there is a diﬀerence in relation to the behavior of men and women. De-
pending on the statement, men can discriminate less in the US. While it is
clear that these country diﬀerences may result from distinct questions and
sample composition of the surveys, the fact is that just as in the United States,
where racial segregation oﬃcially existed until a few decades ago, in Brazil,
where some people claim there exist a Racial Democracy, there is a clear pat-
tern in preferences for discrimination as well. We are going to argue that this
pattern reaches the labor market, influencing the outcomes.
Table 2: Discrimination and Individual Characteristics – ADAE
sample
Index of Whites Whites Whites Blacks Blacks
Discrimi- enjoy study are more are have gotten should try
nation more than evolved than superior more than to be like
Blacks do Blacks to Blacks they deserve Whites
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Brown −0.030∗∗∗
(0.011)
−0.076∗∗∗
(0.021)
−0.054∗∗∗
(0.020)
−0.002
(0.020)
−0.004
(0.019)
−0.042∗∗
(0.020)
Black −0.132∗∗∗
(0.027)
−0.227∗∗∗
(0.043)
−0.184∗∗∗
(0.044)
−0.088∗
(0.049)
−0.106∗∗
(0.047)
−0.183∗∗∗
(0.047)
Woman −0.176∗∗∗
(0.011)
−0.223∗∗∗
(0.019)
−0.186∗∗∗
(0.019)
−0.154∗∗∗
(0.019)
−0.178∗∗∗
(0.019)
−0.206∗∗∗
(0.019)
Age −0.000
(0.001)
−0.000
(0.001)
0.002∗
(0.001)
−0.002∗
(0.001)
−0.003∗∗
(0.001)
0.005∗∗∗
(0.001)
Schooling −0.030∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.031∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.033∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.028∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.034∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.037∗∗∗
(0.007)
Urban −0.066∗∗
(0.029)
−0.081
(0.054)
−0.007
(0.054)
−0.091
(0.058)
−0.086∗
(0.052)
−0.092∗
(0.052)
Obs. 18,114 18,054 18,059 17,98 18,023 18,027
R-squared 0.109 0.040 0.046 0.059 0.051 0.048
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.10.
All regressions include dummies for states and groups of interviewees
(parents, principals, teachers, staﬀ members, and course modalities-grades
combination).
4.4 The marginal discriminator
According to Becker’s model, it is not the average discriminator that deter-
mines the wage gap, but rather the marginal one. In order to test the model it
is necessary to obtain the discrimination coeﬃcient of the marginal employer
for each micro-region. Following Charles & Guryan (2008), we define the
marginal discriminator as the one who is located at the percentile of the dis-
tribution of the discrimination index equal to the proportion of blacks in the
respective micro-region. This idea comes from the theoretical model. Accord-
ing to the model, under other specific conditions, if all employers hire the
same number of employees and the sorting mechanism is at work, the pro-
portion of employers who hire blacks would be equal to the proportion of
blacks. In other words, if in the city of São Paulo it is estimated that 15% of
the population is black, then the coeﬃcient associated with the individual lo-
cated at the 15th percentile of the distribution of the discrimination index for
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São Paulo is considered the coeﬃcient of the marginal discriminator. Strictly
speaking, for this procedure to identify the marginal employer it would be
required that employers were a random sample of the general population in
terms of discrimination and each hired the same number of workers.
Besides the marginal employer index, the average and other moments of
the distribution are also needed not only for control purposes but also to as-
sess robustness of the results and test alternative hypotheses. Specifically,
variables that indicate the coeﬃcients of discrimination for individuals lo-
cated at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the distribution of prejudice
for each micro-region are used, following Charles and Guryan’s strategy.
4.5 Descriptive analysis
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics at the microregion level for the main
variables used in the paper. It is observed that the conditional wage gap be-
tween whites and blacks is -0.091 log points, i.e., blacks earn about 91% of
whites’ mean wage on average. This number comes from the first stage of
the empirical strategy described in the next section, and was estimated using
2010 Census microdata.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics at the micro-region
level
mean s.d.
Conditional wage gap -0.091 0.105
Black 0.543 0.214
Average Prejudice 0.013 0.196
Marginal Prejudice -0.006 0.452
10th percentile -0.580 0.083
50th percentile -0.107 0.249
90th percentile 0.775 0.324
Public schools per 10,000 inhab. 14.9 13.4
Ideb 2007 3.518 0.611
IFDM-Health 0.768 0.102
IDH-M 0.733 0.082
Gini household income 0.543 0.061
ADAE-Obs. per microregion 80.7 112.3
Observations 230
Note: Conditional wage gap estimated in the first stage using
2010 Census microdata sample composed of men 25-60
years-old, who are neither employer nor self-employed,
worked at least 30 hours per week and received positive
wage.
The variable Black indicates the percentage of blacks in each microregion.
As one can see, more than half of our sample is black, since we are considering
browns as minority. The variable Average Prejudice indicates the average of
IDi (coeﬃcient of discrimination) across individuals in each microregion. The
variable Marginal Prejudice refers to the discrimination coeﬃcient associated
with the marginal employer. The number in the table is the mean index of the
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individuals located at the percentile associated with the proportion of blacks
in the microregion. On average, the marginal employer is located at the 54th
percentile of the prejudice distribution. Because Marginal Prejudice is less
than Average Prejudice, the set of “marginal employers” is less prejudiced
than the population, which is consistent with what one would expect from an
employer’s representative sample.
The next three variables contain the discrimination coeﬃcient for each in-
dicated percentile. Thus, both the average level of discrimination and the
discrimination of the marginal employer are below the median of the distri-
bution of prejudice.
In Table 3 we also have the variables used to control for possible confound-
ing factors, which will be explained below. The (log of) number of public
schools per ten thousand inhabitants is used to control for access to education.
To control for quality of education, we use the 2007 Ideb9. It combines student
performance and flow rates for 5th and 9th grades of Elementary School and
3rd grade of High School, and higher values indicate better quality. To con-
trol for quality of health, we have the IFDM-Health index10,which combines
information related to prenatal consultancy, deaths by undefined causes, and
children deaths by avoidable causes. Again, higher values mean better quality
of health. Finally, in addition to a measure for local inequality (the Gini index
for per capita household income), we have a proxy for local development: the
municipal Human Development Index (IDH-M)11.
Table 3 also shows that the ADAE’s average number of observations used to
calculate the discrimination index by microregion is approximately 81. Thus,
for some microregions, there may be some diﬃculties in finding a percentile
that matches the exact percentage of blacks in the population.
5 Empirical strategy
The empirical exercise is to analyze the relationship between the racial wage
gap on the one side, and the proportion of blacks and measures of prejudice
on the other. Following Charles & Guryan (2008), we adopt a procedure in
two stages by OLS. Because discrimination measures are defined at the mi-
croregion level, we first estimate the conditional wage gap for each location,
using a regression at the individual level. Then, the estimated wage gaps
become the dependent variable in the second stage, estimated at the microre-
gional level. This second regression is actually a WLS, as we weight observa-
tions by the precision of the first stage estimates of the dependent variable,
i.e, by the inverse of the standard errors. Each microregion, which is a set
of integrated municipalities geographically near each other, is interpreted as
a local market with relatively homogeneous socioeconomic and productive
characteristics.
To estimate the wage diﬀerential in each micro-region, we use the Mince-
rian equation below:
9Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica (Index of Development of Basic Education).
10The FIRJAN Index of Development of Health.
11This is the Brazilian municipal version of the well-known Human Development Index. To
obtain an index to the micro-regions, we compute the average IDH-M for the municipalities in
each micro-region weighted by the population size. The same procedure was applied to the
FIRJAN Health Index.
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ln(wage)i = α +
∑
j
δjracei ×microregionj +γ
′Xi + ǫi (6)
where wage is the hourly wage of individual i, race is a dummy for blacks,
microregionj is a dummy for the micro-region j , X is a vector of control vari-
ables including dummies for age ranges, schooling and micro-regions, and ǫi
is the error term. Note that the dummy for blacks is always interacted with
the dummies for micro-regions. Then δj refers to the black-white wage gap in
the micro-region j .
Once we have the estimated vector δ̂, it becomes the dependent variable in
the second stage according to the following equation estimated at the micro-
region level:
δ̂j = µ+ β
′Zj +λ
′Wj +υj (7)
where Z is a vector whose elements vary according to the exercise per-
formed, and may include the average discrimination index, the proportion of
blacks, the index for the marginal discriminator, and the percentiles of the
prejudice distribution. Because δ̂j is composed of coeﬃcients of dummies
indicating blacks, their values are generally negative: the closer to zero, the
smaller the estimated black-white wage gap. Therefore, it is expected that the
main variables of interest included in Z , namely the proportion of blacks and
the variable Marginal Prejudice, are inversely related to δ̂j . An increase in
the proportion of blacks, for example, is expected be associated with a higher
wage diﬀerential between blacks and whites, which implies a negative coeﬃ-
cient.
In addition to dummies for geographical regions (North, South, Southeast,
Northeast, Center-West), the vector W includes controls to capture unobserv-
able direct eﬀects of public goods provision on the wage gap, which could be
confounded with the impact of variables in the vector Z . Specifically, there
is a concern about a possible association between micro-region level unob-
servable characteristics and quality of labor and education. In principle, a
negative coeﬃcient for the variable Marginal may indicate that blacks have
worse access to better-quality education and that the local labor market recog-
nizes this fact, although not observable by the econometrician. The prejudice
measured at the local level could capture in part this eﬀect, but controlling
for local public goods provision would minimize this problem. This is be-
cause blacks relative to whites are typically more aﬀected and dependent on
public goods such as public schools and hospitals. Thus, the presence of pub-
lic goods could and should mitigate the wage gap by reducing the diﬀerences
in productive attributes between races. As mentioned before, proxies for the
presence of public goods refer to the number of public schools and the quality
of school and health. We also control for micro-regions development through
IDH-M, and for inequality through Gini index for household income. The
latter, although potentially endogenous in the second stage, should also par-
tially capture diﬀerences in access to public goods and will assist us in the
discussion of results.
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6 Results
All the results discussed in this section refer to the second stage (equation 7)
of the empirical strategy. In general, the Mincerian equation results of the
first stage are in line with the literature12. In Table 4, the dependent variable
is the conditional wage gap between blacks and whites estimated in the first
stage. Each column represents a WLS regression at the microregional level,
where observations are weighted by the precision of the first stage estimates
of the dependent variable.
The first three columns present the correlation between our main variables
of interest and the racial wage gap. Intuitively, one would expect a positive
relationship between the average discrimination and the wage diﬀerential, i.e.
that the higher the average prejudice at the microregion, the larger the wage
gap between blacks and whites. Column (1) shows that this is the case (re-
member that the closer the dependent variable is to zero, the lower the wage
gap), but the estimated coeﬃcient is not statistically significant. On the other
hand, as expected by Becker’s model, column (2) shows that the higher the
prejudice of the marginal employer, the larger the wage gap tends to be.
Table 4: Wage gap and racial discrimination
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average −0.049
(0.034)
0.004
(0.032)
−0.033
(0.031)
−0.014
(0.048)
Marginal −0.033∗∗
(0.016)
−0.034∗∗
(0.017)
−0.016
(0.044)
% Black −0.063∗∗
(0.027)
−0.056∗∗
(0.026)
−0.031
(0.066)
Observations 230 230 230 230 230 230
R-squared 0.012 0.033 0.028 0.033 0.033 0.034
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. First stage
sample includes men 25-60 years-old, who are neither self-employed nor employer, with
positive wages. Regressions weighted by the precision of the first stage estimates of the
dependent variable (inverse of the standard error).
Column (4) includes the average of the index of discrimination and the
prejudice of the marginal employer in the same regression. Exactly as pre-
dicted by the model, the most significant event for the formation of the wage
gap is the degree of prejudice of the marginal employer and not the average
prejudice among employers. The Average is still not significant when both
variables enter the equation. Actually, even its sign is not the one expected at
a first glance. To get a quantitative idea about the importance of preference
discrimination on the determination of the wage gap, according to column (4),
an increase of one standard deviation in the variable Marginal increases the
wage gap in 1.53 percentage points. Considering the conditional wage gap of
9.1% (Table 3), this impact represents a positive increase of 17%.
Another prediction of the model is related to the role of the proportion
of blacks in the labor market. Column (3) indicates that localities with higher
proportion of blacks are those that have higher wage diﬀerentials, as predicted
by the model. Column (5) indicates that this relationship remains the same
12These results are available upon request.
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after the inclusion of the average discrimination in the regression. Quantita-
tively, an increase of 21.4 percentage points in the proportion of blacks (one
standard deviation) leads to an increase of 13% of the conditional wage gap.
This result is somewhat counterintuitive, since one could argue that the larger
the relative size of the minority, the higher will be the contact between groups,
increasing the probability of reducing discrimination through social interac-
tion. This is an anecdotal reasoning typically repeated in Brazil due to its
mixed society, but that is not present in the data: places with a higher pro-
portion of blacks have a higher wage gap between whites and blacks in the
labor market. In addition, this finding adds to what was discussed before, i.e.,
that there is a positive correlation between discrimination and proportion of
blacks. It is worth to remember that these results control for return to educa-
tion through the first stage. It could be the case that the wage gap is higher
not due to the mechanism described by Becker, but because the return to edu-
cation is higher for whites where there is a higher proportion of blacks, since
blacks are less educated on average. Our results show that this is not the case.
In this paper, we prefer not to include the percentage of blacks and the
variable Marginal together in the regression analysis. The reasoning for this
is that, by construction, the variable Marginal is a function of the percentage
of blacks. As discussed in section 4.4, the value of the index of discrimina-
tion of the marginal employer is the result of a match between the percentage
of blacks and the associated percentile of the distribution. Thus, in the re-
gression, it does not make much sense to vary the percentage of blacks while
keeping the variable Marginal constant, because this necessarily changes the
identity of the marginal discriminator. In any case, the inclusion of these
three variables in the same regression (column 6) results in the same negative
eﬀects for the percentage of blacks and the variable Marginal, although none
of them are significant, an expected result due to multicollinearity. Also, the
point estimate of the variable Average is still close to zero.
In summary, the eﬀects discussed so far present a remarkable result that
would be very diﬃcult to rationalize outside the environment of Becker’s
model. In Brazil’s context, this is even more surprising since one does not
clearly observe the same level of racial tension in its society as one can ob-
serve in the United States, for example. In the following sections, we argue
that, in spite of that, those are very robust results.
6.1 Public Goods
Table 5 presents the estimates including controls for public services. The table
refers to the specification where we include the variable Marginal Prejudice.
We discuss the results including the proportion of blacks later on. Column (1)
repeats columns (4) of Table 4. The other columns add previously discussed
controls in an attempt to minimize the possibility that the locally measured
index of discrimination capture eﬀects of unobservable productivity charac-
teristics that determine the wage gap, such as the quality of education.
As one can see, in general, the eﬀect of the variableMarginal maintains the
expected sign and is statistically significant at 5% in all but one specification
after including controls. In particular, column (3) to (5) present the same
coeﬃcient in spite of distinct control vectors. In a broader perspective, this
scenario suggests that our measure of prejudice is quite orthogonal to other
factors potentially associated with the wage gap.
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Table 5: Incorporating public goods and other controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Marginal −0.034∗∗
(0.017)
−0.054∗∗
(0.027)
−0.054∗∗
(0.023)
−0.052∗∗
(0.025)
−0.055∗∗
(0.024)
−0.045∗
(0.023)
Average 0.004
(0.032)
0.019
(0.036)
−0.022
(0.036)
−0.022
(0.037)
−0.024
(0.037)
−0.021
(0.036)
Public Schools 0.028∗∗
(0.012)
0.028∗∗
(0.012)
0.034∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.014
(0.011)
Ideb 2007 0.037∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.037∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.023∗∗
(0.012)
0.007
(0.010)
IFDM Health 0.013
(0.087)
0.052
(0.086)
0.033
(0.082)
IDH-M −0.280∗
(0.161)
−0.131
(0.151)
Gini −0.525∗∗∗
(0.103)
Region dummies X X X X X
Observations 230 230 230 230 230 230
R-squared 0.033 0.042 0.184 0.184 0.194 0.293
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.10. First stage sample includes
men 25-60 years-old, who are neither self-employed nor employer, with positive wages.
Regressions weighted by the precision of the first stage estimates of the dependent variable
(inverse of the standard errors).
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Column (2) includes dummies to account for geographical regions eﬀects
(North, Northeast, Southeast, South and Center-West) and shows that there
are no such issues. The biggest concern of our empirical strategy would be the
possibility of unobserved factors related to quality of education being corre-
lated with our measure of prejudice. Column (3) includes the number of pub-
lic schools per 10 thousands inhabitants and the Ideb, a quality of education
index. As expected, both variables are associated with less discrimination in
the labor market. A larger number of schools reaches a larger share of blacks
who, as a minority, are those who need them most and most benefit from
them, making localities better provided with public schools to have lower
wage gaps. In addition, it is certainly not enough to have access to education.
The Ideb index controls for the quality of education the minority has access
to. Better-quality schools mean that possible diﬀerences in unobserved pro-
ductivity characteristics are minimized, which implies that the black-white
wage gap should be lower. Both variables are significant in all specifications,
except when we include the Gini index for household per capita income. We
are going to discuss Gini index later in this section. Nevertheless, the point
here is that there is no change in the estimated coeﬃcient of the marginal
discriminator after the inclusion of these controls.
Another threat to our empirical strategy is the unobservable aspects re-
lated to health. Better access to health would be associated with a more pro-
ductive minority, which would decrease the observed wage gap and could be
correlated with the measure of prejudice. However, column (4) shows that
this seems to not be the case: the IFDM index of health controls for quality of
health in each microregion and, in spite of being negatively correlated to the
wage gap, it is not statistically significant and its inclusion does not change
the variable Marginal.
Column (5) includes a measure of local development, the local Human
Development Index (IDH-M). There is this idea that more developed societies
are less prejudiced. If this is true, our variables of interest may be capturing
local development instead of prejudice. By comparing the coeﬃcients of the
variable Marginal in column (6) to the other columns, one can see that there
is no such relationship since, again, there is no change in the coeﬃcient of
the marginal discriminator. This is our preferred specification. An increase of
one standard deviation in the variable Marginal increases the racial wage gap
by 27%.
It is interesting, though, that the IDH-M coeﬃcient turns out to be nega-
tive, suggesting a positive correlation to the racial wage gap. Column (6) is
useful to rationalize this result. It includes the Gini index of household in-
come in the regression, along with the other controls. As expected, inequality
is associated with higher wage gaps. This correlation ascends because the Gini
index is potentially endogenous, since it contributes to the wage gap. But in-
equality can also be interpreted as a broader measure of access to education
and health. After including the Gini index in the regression, the eﬀect of edu-
cation variables vanishes, a result that can be attributed to the correlation be-
tween inequality and public services. This also happens to the IDH-M: it sug-
gests that inequality and local development are positively correlated in Brazil-
ian microregions, since the IDHM coeﬃcient decreases in absolute terms. The
more relevant result, though, is that controlling for inequality causes no sub-
stantial change in the eﬀect of the variable of interest: the Marginal remains
negative and significant at 10%.
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6.2 Nonlinearity of the percentage of blacks
The results including the percentage of blacks instead of the variable Marginal
are quite similar qualitatively. Because of that, it is more interesting to discuss
the possibility of nonlinear eﬀects of the percentage of blacks. Table 6 reports
specifications testing this nonlinearity hypothesis. Column (1) includes the
linear variable only, while column (2) includes a quadratic term, and column
(3) substitutes dummies representing quartiles of the percentage of blacks’
distribution with the continuous variables. All specifications include the same
controls as column (5) of Table 5.
Table 6: Nonlinear eﬀects of percentage of blacks
(1) (2) (3)
% Black −0.126∗∗
(0.049)
0.171
(0.151)
(% Black) squared −0.296∗∗
(0.144)
% Black - 2nd quartile dummy −0.013
(0.016)
% Black - 3rd quartile dummy −0.035∗
(0.019)
% Black - 4th quartile dummy −0.060∗∗
(0.023)
Observations 230 230 230
R-squared 0.200 0.212 0.202
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Regressions include the same controls as column (5) of Table 5, except the
variable Marginal. First stage sample includes men 25-60 years-old, who are
neither self-employed nor employer, with positive wages. Regressions
weighted by the precision of the first stage estimates of the dependent
variable (inverse of the standard errors).
The linear specification suggests that each 10 percentage point increase
in the percentage of blacks increases the racial wage gap by 1.26 percentage
points, which represents 14% of the conditional wage gap. On the other hand,
column (2) shows that when the percentage of blacks is low, there is actually
a decrease (at a decreasing rate) in the racial wage gap, although the linear
term is not significant. It also suggests that when the percentage of blacks
reaches around 29%, there is an inflection point in which the percentage of
blacks starts to have a positive eﬀect on the racial wage gap. It is worth noting
that the average percentage of blacks across microregions is 54.3%, with a
standard deviation of 21.4. In almost 72% of the microregions we have more
than 29% of blacks.
The lack of significance of the linear term in column (2) motivates the spec-
ification reported in column (3). As one can see, the eﬀect of the percentage
of blacks is increasing through the quartiles of the distribution, and is statisti-
cally significant at 10% for the highest two. This means that the consequences
of prejudice discrimination are more severe in locations where the minority
is actually the largest group of the population. Remember the discussion in
Section 2, where we highlighted that in Brazil, when one considers browns as
part of the minority, the minority becomes the largest group in the country.
Despite that, compared to locations where blacks are minority de facto, they
are even more discriminated.
Discrimination by Preference 89
6.3 Moments of the Distribution
Average discrimination can be interpreted as a control for the distribution of
prejudice. In this sense, we showed that the index of discrimination of the
marginal employer has a positive eﬀect on the black-white wage gap, keeping
that distribution fixed. In order to better control for the distribution of prej-
udice, we test alternative specifications by substituting the index of discrim-
ination related to percentiles of the distribution of prejudice for the average
discrimination13. Table 7 presents the estimated coeﬃcients of equation (7) af-
ter the inclusion of three distribution percentiles in two distinct regressions:
10th, 50th and 90th in column (1) and 20th, 50th and 80th in column (2). The
idea is to discard the possibility that the variable Marginal is actually captur-
ing the eﬀect of some specific moment of the distribution instead of the eﬀect
of the marginal discriminator. Both specifications include the same controls
as column (5) of Table 5.
The results of these alternative specifications are very similar to the pre-
viously discussed. The Marginal coeﬃcients remain negative and statistically
significant at 10%. More importantly, none of the variables representing mo-
ments of the prejudice distribution presents a statistically significant coeﬃ-
cient. Because in Brazil the percentage of blacks varies considerably across
microregions, we did not expect any specific percentile to be related to the
wage gap14. We conclude that we are not capturing some unobservable eﬀect
of a particular point of the distribution.
7 Final remarks
This paper presents evidence of discrimination by preference in the Brazilian
labor market. Specifically, using data from 2010 Census and Discriminatory
Action in the School Survey (2008), two hypotheses derived from the model of
employer discrimination (Becker, 1957) are tested, following a methodology
similar to Charles & Guryan (2008). The first hypothesis states that the wage
gap is determined by the degree of prejudice of the marginal employer, and
not by the average prejudice among employers. The second hyphothesis states
that, given the distribution of prejudice, the higher the proportion of minority,
the greater the wage gap will be.
Our estimates indicate that both hypotheses are true in the Brazilian case.
In our preferred specification, an increase of one standard deviation in the
degree of prejudice of the marginal employer results in an increase of 27%
in the conditional wage diﬀerential between blacks and whites. Also, an in-
crease of 10 percentage points in the proportion of blacks is associated with
an increase of 14% in the wage gap. Despite the strong assumptions we have
made to reach these numbers, it seems that the label Racial Democracy does
not fit so well to Brazil’s society.
In addition, these results have an important consequence for public policy.
If, indeed, we are facing wage diﬀerentials caused by discrimination by prefer-
13The use of percentiles is inspired by Charles & Guryan (2008) who use it in a diﬀerent
context.
14In the United States, the percentage of blacks is relatively constant across states (10%). Thus,
Charles & Guryan (2008) consider the 10th percentile a proxy for the marginal discriminator. In
their case, it is natural to expect a high correlation between the 10th percentile and the variable
Marginal.
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Table 7: Including controls for the moments
of distribution
(1) (2)
Marginal −0.047∗
(0.025)
−0.054∗∗
(0.025)
10th percentile −0.045
(0.094)
20th percentile 0.044
(0.089)
50th percentile −0.002
(0.042)
−0.053
(0.058)
80th percentile 0.012
(0.030)
90th percentile −0.022
(0.020)
Observations 230 230
R-squared 0.199 0.197
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ∗∗∗
p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.10. Second stage controls
are the same as column (5) of Table 7. First stage
sample includes men 25-60 years-old, who are
neither self-employed nor employer, with positive
wages. Regressions weighted by the precision of
the first stage estimates of the dependent variable
(inverse of the standard errors).
ences, aﬃrmative action policies, such as quotas for minorities in universities,
will not eliminate the problem. One possible solution to mitigate the wage
gap is to increase competition in the product market. This would force em-
ployers who discriminate out of business, or change their preferences. In any
case, the wage gap tends to decrease.
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Appendix A ADAE questions related to racial discrimination
1. In general, whites are more dedicated students than blacks.
2. White children learn faster than black children.
3. Blacks are more violent than whites.
4. Blacks’ body shape is good for physical labor.
5. Black students frequently cause disorder in school.
6. Whites deserve more valued jobs than blacks.
7. Whites enjoy study more than blacks do.
8. Blacks show oﬀmore than whites in social events.
9. Black women have more aptitude to be maid than white women.
10. Whites are more evolved than blacks.
11. White students are better behaved than blacks ones.
12. Whites are superior to blacks.
13. Blacks have gotten more than they deserve.
14. Blacks should not complain, they are where they should be.
15. Blacks should try to be like whites.
16. Nowadays, blacks have more political influence then they deserve.
17. Blacks are better cooker than whites.
18. Blacks have more ability to perform manual labor.
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